

— A FIRST LOOK AT —
COMMUNICATION THEORY

The following document is an **archived chapter**
from a previous edition of
A First Look at Communication Theory
by Em Griffin, the leading college text in the
field of communication theory
(all editions published by McGraw-Hill).

The theory is no longer covered in a full chapter of the current edition.

This document is posted on the resource website for the text
www.afirstlook.com

All material is copyright © Em Griffin
or used by permission of the copyright holder
(Note that some cartoons reproduced in the textbook
could not be included in the archived documents because
copyright permission does not extend to online use.)

Anxiety/Uncertainty Management Theory

of William Gudykunst

During a sabbatical leave from Wheaton College, I spent a month in the Philippine Islands. When a Filipino couple I knew heard that I was coming to their country, they asked me to spend a week with them on an “academic adventure.” Ping and Lena were former graduate students of mine who occasionally taught at Mickelson College, a small, church-related school in the remote province of the Davao del Sur. Lena had used a text of mine for a course at the school, and she invited me to be the commencement speaker at their graduation.

The students and staff at Mickelson are Belaan Indians. In addition to their native tongue, they speak a dialect of Cebuano; English is their third language and is taught in the school. To get to their campus from Manila, I had to fly first on a jet, then on a prop plane. The trip continued by jeep and concluded with a six-hour pump boat ride over open water. Ping and Lena explained that the 100 students and 10 faculty members faced multiple threats of disease, violent weather, rebel insurgency, and piracy—in that order. Located on the top of a small mountain, the school had no electricity or running water. A banner in their chapel proclaimed, “Lo, I am with you always, even unto the end of the world.”¹ I felt I was there.

ENTER THE STRANGER

Bill Gudykunst’s anxiety/uncertainty management (AUM) theory focuses on encounters between cultural in-groups and strangers. Gudykunst, who died in 2005, was professor of communication at California State University, Fullerton, and he developed his interest in intergroup communication when he served as an intercultural relations specialist for the U.S. Navy in Japan. His job was to help naval personnel and their families adjust to living in a culture that seemed very strange to Americans.

Although I've included AUM in the section on intercultural communication, Gudykunst intended his theory to apply in any situation where differences between people spawn doubts and fears. For example, once a month I'm one of four men who cook breakfast, serve it, and clean up afterward at a local homeless center. I make it a point to talk with guests who show a desire for early morning conversation, but I'm never sure what topics are appropriate and I'm somewhat nervous about saying something that will embarrass them (or me). Throughout the chapter I will use the terms *intergroup* and *intercultural* interchangeably to reflect the scope of the theory and the fact that we don't have to travel to a foreign land to either be—or encounter—a stranger.

Gudykunst assumed that at least one person in an intercultural encounter is a *stranger*.² Through a series of initial crises, strangers experience both anxiety and uncertainty—they don't feel secure, and they aren't sure how to behave. Although strangers and ingroup members experience some degree of anxiety and uncertainty in any new interpersonal situation, when the encounter takes place between people of different cultures, strangers are hyperaware of cultural differences. They tend to overestimate the effect of cultural identity on the behavior of people in an alien society, while blurring individual distinctions ("When I was in the Philippines I noticed that all Filipinos are . . .").

As a stranger in a strange land, I experienced all the thoughts and feelings that Gudykunst describes. But lest we get hung up on our own doubts and insecurities, Gudykunst's words remind us that my hosts at Mickelson were subject to the same pangs of anxiety and uncertainty that affected me. It was a novel situation for them as well—I was only the second Caucasian visitor they'd had at their school in a decade. As an outsider within their midst, my presence was a mixed blessing. By coming from afar, I affirmed their importance yet carried the baggage of foreign values. I was physically close but brought with me strange ways of doing things.

Gudykunst made it clear that AUM was always under construction. Early accounts cast his ideas into cause-and-effect axioms written from the standpoint of the stranger. Recent efforts flip the perspective and describe intercultural encounters with strangers as experienced by members of the ingroup. In an effort to avoid the ethnocentric trap of thinking that my view of the world is the way it *really* is, I'll illustrate Gudykunst's theory by applying it to the situation of my Philippine Belaan hosts. They wanted to bridge the culture gap through effective communication just as much as I did.

EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION: THWARTED BY ANXIETY AND UNCERTAINTY

Gudykunst uses the term *effective communication* to refer to the process of minimizing misunderstandings. He wrote that "communication is effective to the extent that the person interpreting the message attaches a meaning to the message that is relatively similar to what was intended by the person transmitting it."³ Other authors use a variety of terms to convey the same idea—*accuracy*, *fidelity*, *mutual understanding*.⁴ According to Gudykunst, effective communication between

Mickelson’s president, Pol Quia, and me would not necessarily require that we draw close, share similar attitudes, or even speak with clarity—as welcome as these outcomes might be. Gudykunst would have considered our communication effective if Pol and I could accurately predict and explain each other’s behavior to the extent that these actions tied into our discussion. In other words, no big surprises.

Figure 30–1 diagrams Gudykunst’s theory of anxiety/uncertainty management.⁵ The theory is designed to explain how effective face-to-face communica-




FIGURE 30–1 A Schematic Representation of AUM Theory

(From Gudykunst, “An Anxiety/Uncertainty Management (AUM) Theory of Effective Communication: Making the Mesh of the Net Finer.”)

tion is accomplished, and the box at the far right of the figure represents that goal. Gudykunst said that cutting down on misunderstanding is hard work, especially when the stranger comes from a wildly different culture. As the title of his theory suggests, and the figure depicts, he believed that uncertainty and anxiety are the twin threats that must be managed to achieve effective communication. They are the basic cause of intercultural misunderstanding. Gudykunst's research shows that anxiety and uncertainty usually go together,⁶ yet he saw them as different in that uncertainty is cognitive, whereas anxiety is affective—an emotion.

Gudykunst formed his ideas of uncertainty based on Charles Berger's uncertainty reduction theory (see Chapter 9). Uncertainty includes the doubts we have about our ability to predict the outcome of our encounters with strangers. For example, would my gift of an *Encyclopaedia Britannica* to the Mickelson library be regarded as an educational treasure or an insensitive judgment on their lack of academic resources? In that sense, uncertainty looks to the future.

Uncertainty also includes doubts we have about the past. As we mentally review an intergroup encounter, we may be unable to explain why any of us acted as we did. For example, why did students carry cases of Coke up the mountain when I arrived at Mickelson? Was this effort in recognition of my status as honored visitor, an accommodation to my queasy North American stomach, or a tacit statement that there would be nothing stronger to drink during my stay? I wasn't sure.

Uncertainty is a thought; anxiety is a feeling. Gudykunst defined anxiety as "the feeling of being uneasy, tense, worried, or apprehensive about what might happen."⁷ Just as people fall silent when they fear that their contrary opinions will cause them to be isolated, so both strangers and ingroup members eye the future warily when their differences make mutual satisfaction seem unlikely. The district superintendent expressed this form of fear the night before the Mickelson graduation.

I delivered a 40-minute address to students and their families at the senior-class baccalaureate ceremony. Because most of the Belaan parents spoke no English, I stopped every few sentences for the superintendent to translate my words into their tongue. Therefore, the 40 minutes consisted of 20 minutes of message plus 20 minutes of interpretation. After I was through, the obviously worried man took me aside and explained the local rhetorical facts of life. What I had said was fine, he told me, but it was way too brief. Unless I spoke at the graduation ceremony the next day for at least an hour—without an "interrupter"—the local citizens would regard the ceremony as of little consequence and the students would "lose face." Now I was worried.

The experience demonstrates the extent to which anxiety and uncertainty are linked to the degree of difference between the culture of the ingroup and the culture from which the stranger comes. Gudykunst's basic AUM model shown in Figure 30-1 doesn't portray the dimensions of cross-cultural variability as conceived of by Geert Hofstede (see the introduction to this section). Yet 9 of the 47 axioms that Gudykunst laid out in AUM draw upon Hofstede's four dimensions that stake out cultural differences. The axioms make it clear that the wider the gap between cultures, the higher the levels of anxiety and uncertainty all parties will tend to experience.

The book contains a *Far Side* cartoon here.
Permission to reproduce the cartoon was
granted for the original publication only and
does not include reproduction in the online archive.

According to Hofstede's research, the Philippines and the United States are almost identical in their strong emphases on masculinity and high tolerance for ambiguity.⁸ But the two cultures diverge sharply on the dimension of power position and collectivism versus individualism. I was an egalitarian individualist invading the world of hierarchical collectivists. No wonder they had some doubts and fears to overcome when I arrived.

Lower and Upper Thresholds for Fears and Doubts

Anxiety and uncertainty aren't always bad. Gudykunst insisted that a minimal level of both are necessary to motivate us to communicate better. If we feel ab-

solutely no tension in an intergroup encounter, we may be bored and thus careless about what we say. The “Ugly American” stereotype is based on insensitive travelers from the United States who can’t be bothered to monitor how they come across in other cultures. They’d be more effective if they were concerned about appearing prejudiced or seeming to be incompetent. Gudykunst said that our minimum threshold of anxiety is the least amount we can feel while still having enough adrenaline running through our veins to prod us to communicate effectively. In like manner, the minimum threshold of uncertainty is the “lowest amount of uncertainty we can have and not feel bored or overconfident about our predictions of strangers’ behavior.”⁹ If we’re no longer curious about the stranger, we’ll go on automatic pilot and likely misinterpret the words we hear.

There comes a point where anxiety can be so great that people become paralyzed with fear. At this catastrophic point, drastic changes are evident in the way people communicate. Since they no longer can concentrate on the message or the messenger, they fall back on negative stereotypes or simply withdraw from the conversation. When uncertainty reaches an upper threshold, people lose all confidence that they can predict others’ behavior, and communication no longer seems worthwhile. AUM postulates that effective communication is possible only when participants’ levels of anxiety and uncertainty fall somewhere between those upper and lower thresholds. Within that middle range, if we mindfully reduce these two basic causes of misunderstanding, Gudykunst assured us that we’ll become more effective intergroup communicators.

MINDFULNESS: CONSCIOUS CHOICE RATHER THAN SCRIPTED BEHAVIOR

According to AUM, *mindfulness* is the way that ingroup members and strangers can reduce their anxiety and uncertainty to optimum levels. It’s the opposite of being mindless. Our talk is mindless when we follow a set conversational routine. The way we answer the phone, place an order at McDonald’s, or kid around with our friends becomes so habitual that we can do it without thinking. Someone watching us play out our lives could easily spot a number of *scripts* we seem to follow when we communicate with others.

Scripted behavior may serve us well when the roles are familiar and all the players know their lines, but Gudykunst cautioned that mindless conversation in a cross-cultural situation can escalate the tension and confusion that already are there. In order to reduce anxiety and uncertainty rather than create more, Pol Quia needs to pay attention to what he says and how I respond. I need to monitor my words and Pol’s reaction as well.

William Howell, one of Gudykunst’s mentors at the University of Minnesota, suggests four levels of communication competence:¹⁰

1. *Unconscious incompetence.* We misinterpret others’ behavior and aren’t even aware we’re doing so. Ignorance is bliss.
2. *Conscious incompetence.* We know that we’re misinterpreting others’ behavior but don’t do anything about it.

3. *Conscious competence.* We think about our communication and continually work at changing what we do in order to become more effective.
4. *Unconscious competence.* We've developed our communication skills to the point where we no longer have to think about how we speak or listen.

Gudykunst defined *mindfulness* as Stage 3 in Howell's model. In fact, following Harvard psychologist Ellen Langer's notion of *mindful learning*, he thought Stage 4 is less competent than Stage 3 and can be downright dangerous.¹¹ Someone operating at that level may look and feel like a "natural," but situations with strangers are often so fluid that unconscious competence can quickly turn into oblivious incompetence.

Langer suggests that being mindful involves the creation of new categories rather than simply classifying people according to their ethnicity, gender, age, wealth, or roles. The process is akin to Delia's description of cognitively complex persons using a rich number of interpersonal constructs when they form their impressions of others (see Chapter 13). Langer also states that mindfulness means being open to new information and recognizing that the other person may have a different perspective than we do. Gudykunst agreed but said that most people rarely do it. "The vast majority of the time (i.e., when we are not mindful), we interpret strangers' messages using our own frames of reference and they interpret our messages using their frames of reference."¹²

Throughout this book I've identified theories according to their objective or interpretive assumptions. In Chapter 1, I stated that objectivist theorists see people as shaped by outside forces, whereas interpretive theorists emphasize our freedom of choice. Gudykunst said both positions are right at different times, depending on our mindset. He believed that objectivist assumptions hold when we aren't mindful. For most of the time our behavior is strongly influenced by our culture, group memberships, environmental forces, and situational factors. But he was convinced that interpretive assumptions of human nature are correct when we are mindful. At these significant moments we are free to think in new ways and can consciously choose to act uncharacteristically—to break out of scripted behavior.

The interpretive right side of Figure 30–1 reflects Gudykunst's conviction that ingroup members and strangers have the potential to manage and moderate their anxiety and uncertainty—the basic causes of poor intercultural communication. To the extent that they are mindfully attentive to the process, their communication can be effective. I believe three of the Mickelson faculty couples made conscious efforts to negotiate joint meanings and create mutual understandings with me during my first weeklong visit. That's why I've returned to Davao del Sur four times over the last two decades.

CAUSES OF ANXIETY AND UNCERTAINTY IN INTERCULTURAL ENCOUNTERS

The objective left side of Figure 30–1 pulls together many factors that typically cause uncertainty and anxiety to rise or fall in intercultural encounters. Don't let Gudykunst's label of *Superficial Causes* fool you into thinking they are unimpor-

tant. They are superficial only in the sense that they are the surface factors that contribute to the underlying issues of anxiety and uncertainty in intergroup communication. Thirty-nine of AUM's 47 axioms present cause-and-effect linkages to the fear and confusion that usually occur when cultures clash. I'll present 10 of these axioms that I've found especially helpful in understanding my initial encounter with the indigenous Filipino faculty and students at Mickelson College. As you'll see, the axioms draw heavily on ideas advanced by other communication theorists. In that sense, AUM provides a great review of much that you've already read in earlier chapters.

All of Gudykunst's axioms contain boundary conditions that specify when the causal relationship holds true or when it doesn't apply. For each of these 10, the scope is the same:

Boundary condition: This axiom holds only when our anxiety and uncertainty are between our minimum and maximum thresholds, and we are not mindful.¹³

In other words, this is how intergroup anxiety and uncertainty are usually created and alleviated, but when fear and confusion are almost nonexistent or extremely high, the rules of the game change and all bets are off. Also, mindfulness trumps these causal patterns. While keeping these exceptions in mind, consider the following 10 predictions.

Self-Concept

Axiom 3: An increase in our self-esteem when interacting with strangers will produce a decrease in our anxiety and an increase in our ability to predict their behavior accurately.

Mead's symbolic interactionism suggests that our self-image is formed by the way we see others regarding us—the looking-glass self (see Chapter 4). Because of their poverty, ethnic origin, and religious convictions, this Belaan community was looked down on by other people of Davao del Sur. During my weeklong stay, they repeatedly voiced their surprise that I would go out of my way to be with them. Hopefully, my sincere admiration for their warmth, faith, courage, and resourcefulness was one small pebble on the scale of self-esteem. But Axiom 3 predicts that they could have a tough time dealing with any anxiety that my visit aroused.

Motivation to Interact

Axiom 9: An increase in our confidence in our ability to predict strangers' behavior will produce a decrease in our anxiety; a decrease in our anxiety will produce an increase in our confidence in predicting strangers' behavior.

Because I try to write in a personal voice, Mickelson faculty and staff who had read my text already had preconceptions of my personality and how I'd act. Fortunately, there was a match between their anticipation and who I turned out to be in person. I repeatedly heard the comment "You're just like you are in the book."

Since I value the congruence that Carl Rogers advocates (see Chapter 2), I greatly appreciated their words. My hosts seemed to take equal delight in the fact that their forecast was accurate. After the first day they became more at ease when we talked.

Reactions to Strangers

Axiom 10: An increase in our ability to process information complexly about strangers will produce a decrease in our anxiety and an increase in our ability to predict their behavior accurately.

Delia's constructivism assumes that cognitively complex people are best equipped to take the perspective of others (see Chapter 13). As I talked with Bing Quia, the wife of Mickelson's president, she showed that she didn't think of people in either/or categories. Perhaps her interpersonal flexibility was due to her wider knowledge of Filipino society—she was the only adult at the school who wasn't Belaan by birth. Whatever the reason for her ability to differentiate personality constructs, Bing seemed to be able to sense my thoughts and feelings and express them to others in the group.

Axiom 13: An increase in our tolerance for ambiguity will produce a decrease in our anxiety.

Given the slow pace of life in a remote setting without telephone, television, or daily mail, students at Mickelson found it difficult to understand my concern about returning to Manila on a specific day. After a few questions, however, they seemed to accept this stranger's preoccupation with schedule as a puzzle not worth worrying about. Even though I was the visitor to their culture, I sensed that they were compiling a "thick description" of my cultural values without having to make immediate sense of what they observed (see Chapter 20).

Social Categorization of Strangers

Axiom 17: An increase in the personal similarities we perceive between ourselves and strangers will produce a decrease in our anxiety and an increase in our ability to accurately predict their behavior.

Burke used the term *identification* to refer to the similarities that make interpersonal communion possible (see Chapter 23). Despite our cultural, ethnic, and socioeconomic differences, the teachers at Mickelson and I shared a concern for quality education with a desire to be involved with students outside the classroom. We also were parents of children approximately the same age. As if these similarities didn't provide enough common ground, I was shipwrecked with the district superintendent in a violent thunderstorm. That life-threatening experience together made thoughts of stranger-danger recede and drew us together in a common bond.

Axiom 20: An increase in perceiving that we share superordinate ingroup identities with strangers will produce a decrease in our anxiety and an increase in our ability to predict their behavior accurately.

Superordinate values or goals are those that trump lesser important identities. As members of a faith-based school in the Philippines that shared the same religious commitment as my college in the United States, they rightly assumed that we shared a tie that bound us together. Mickelson is a Christian school in a Muslim area of Mindanao; no credential that I possessed was more important to my Filipino hosts than our common faith. I assume that religion would also have been a superordinate issue for any stranger who came to the Islamic school across the valley.

Situational Processes

Axiom 26: An increase in the power we perceive that we have over strangers will produce a decrease in our anxiety and a decrease in the accuracy of our predictions of their behavior.

As a guest in an isolated community, I was completely dependent on my hosts for food, shelter, information about the surrounding area, and the schedule of daily activities. They seemed to enjoy this control and I faced resistance when I tried to discover what they had planned for the next day. Afraid that I'd never get off campus, I went exploring on my own before breakfast. My hosts were horrified. Didn't I know it was dangerous to be in the jungle on my own? They shook their heads in dismay. What would I be doing next?

Connections with Strangers

Axiom 27: An increase in our attraction to strangers will produce a decrease in our anxiety and an increase in our confidence in predicting their behavior.

At the end of my visit, Pol told me that our relationship was solidified with laughter. It started when I was afraid of crossing a ravine on a felled coconut tree, so I crawled across on all fours like an animal. The Belaans began to giggle at the ridiculous sight, and I couldn't help laughing with them. After that, whenever the conversation got dull, someone would grunt like a pig and we'd all break out laughing. As social penetration theory predicts, attraction led to vulnerability and self-disclosure (see Chapter 8).

Axiom 31: An increase in networks we share with strangers will produce a decrease in our anxiety and an increase in our ability to accurately predict their behavior.

This axiom is a direct extension of the one Berger added to his original uncertainty reduction theory (see Chapter 9). Ping and Lena, my former graduate students, were the only people the Mickelson staff and I knew in common, but they acted as enthusiastic go-betweens as they both sponsored me and endorsed my hosts.

Ethical Interactions

Axiom 34: An increase in our moral inclusiveness toward strangers will produce a decrease in our anxiety.

As I belatedly discovered, I committed a number of blunders that had moral implications in this remote Philippine community. I failed to eat everything that Bing served, I used more than a bucket of fresh water for my sponge bath, and I embarrassed the Mickelson faculty when I asked them to tell me about the problems they had in their school. Yet they gave me a “visitor’s pass,” not blaming me for my insensitivity. As one “cultural informant” later told me, “We didn’t judge you, because we wanted to make sure that you didn’t judge us. It was better that way.”

These 10 examples provide a sample of the multiple factors that Gudykunst claimed affect the anxiety and uncertainty that people experience when a stranger comes into their midst. The continual tie-in with other communication theory and research demonstrates Gudykunst’s belief that intercultural communication is an extension of, rather than an exception to, principles of interpersonal communication. It’s all a matter of degree. The stranger a stranger is, the more everyone involved has to work mindfully at overcoming anxiety and uncertainty.

CRITIQUE: REFLECTIONS ON THE CHOICES THAT GUDYKUNST MADE

You may remember that Michael Sunnafrank is a severe critic of uncertainty reduction theory—the theory that was the original catalyst for AUM (see Chapter 9). Yet Sunnafrank acknowledges the impact and scope of Gudykunst’s work: “unarguably the most prolific communication research program in the 1980s is being conducted by Gudykunst and his associates.”¹⁴ This flow of scholarship continued until his death; he was constantly revising and extending the application of his theory.

There is a danger, however, that the student of communication could easily be overwhelmed by the sheer quantity and detail of Gudykunst’s theoretical predictions. I find it hard to get my arms around 34 variables that are linked to anxiety and uncertainty, and then to another 13 that lay out the relationships among *anxiety*, *uncertainty*, *mindfulness*, *effective communication*, and *cross-cultural variability*. Gudykunst acknowledged the large number of axioms, but he didn’t regard them as excessive for a theory that aims at clarity and usefulness: “I include a sufficient number of statements to make anxiety/uncertainty management processes clear to readers who may want to apply the theory to improve their communication effectiveness.”¹⁵

In the final section of the book I discuss the compromises or “trade-offs” each theorist must make when constructing a theory. No theory can do it all. Gudykunst made a conscious choice to create a theory in the “grand” tradition—a theory that addresses a vast array of communication variables in a variety of communication contexts. He then decided to cast his conclusions in specific axioms that are easily applied. One has to admire the ambitious scope of the project. What he sacrificed, of necessity, is simplicity. As you can tell by the way I’ve set up this chapter, it’s not

a choice I would have made. Instead of listing the 47 axioms, I decided to illustrate some and summarize a few. But as a serious student of communication theory and practice, I'm glad Gudykunst and some others think big.

I'm also intrigued with Gudykunst's solution to the age-old dilemma concerning free will and determinism. Most theorists either explicitly or tacitly plant their flag somewhere on the continuum between the two extremes, but neither they nor their readers seem particularly comfortable with their selection. In what I regard as a potentially brilliant move, Gudykunst made it possible to embrace *both* sides of the scale. Each of his axioms is conditional on whether or not ingroup members engage in mindful interaction. When they don't, their behavior is determined—or at least quite predictable. When they do, they are freed up to act in novel ways. For empirically minded researchers (like Gudykunst), the problem with this solution is that there isn't yet any procedure to measure when people are being mindful, so there's no way to test his assumption. And as Gudykunst acknowledged, "A method for assessing our minimum and maximum thresholds for anxiety and uncertainty has not been developed."¹⁶ Without being able to measure the theory's most important variables, it's hard to test it or apply it with confidence in specific situations.

Stella Ting-Toomey, Gudykunst's colleague at California State University, Fullerton, questions whether the whole uncertainty reduction approach reflects a Western bias. She notes that the implicit goal of uncertainty reduction is to control one's environment—a theme that is "highly valued by Western, individualistic cultures but not necessarily by Eastern, collectivistic cultures."¹⁷ Gudykunst strongly objected, noting that according to Geert Hofstede's list, most Asian countries are high on uncertainty avoidance. (See the introduction to this section.)

But the issue Ting-Toomey raises is more far-reaching than the relative importance of reducing uncertainty. What's at stake is the question of whether or not a pan-human theory of intercultural communication is possible.¹⁸ You'll have a chance to consider the issue of comparative theory and East-West differences when you read about Ting-Toomey's face-negotiation theory in the next chapter.

QUESTIONS TO SHARPEN YOUR FOCUS

1. When might the reduction of *anxiety* and *uncertainty* hinder rather than help facilitate *effective communication*?
2. Which of the 10 *superficial causes* of anxiety and uncertainty that I presented would apply to communication between teenagers and the elderly? Would they be different for encounters between heterosexuals and homosexuals?
3. Can you think of situations where *mindfulness* might hinder rather than help effective communication?
4. Think of the most culturally diverse *intercultural encounter* you've ever had. Which of Hofstede's four *dimensions of cultural variability* were highly discrepant?

SELF-QUIZ



For chapter self-quizzes go to the book's Online Learning Center at
www.mhhe.com/griffin6

A SECOND LOOK

Recommended resource: William B. Gudykunst, "An Anxiety/Uncertainty Management (AUM) Theory of Effective Communication: Making the Mesh of the Net Finer," in *Theorizing About Intercultural Communication*, William B. Gudykunst (ed.), Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA, 2005, pp. 281–332.

Earlier version: William B. Gudykunst, "Anxiety/Uncertainty Management (AUM) Theory: Current Status," in *Intercultural Communication Theory*, R. L. Wiseman (ed.), Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA, 1995, pp. 8–58.

First formal statement of AUM: William B. Gudykunst, "Toward a Theory of Effective Interpersonal and Intergroup Communication: An Anxiety/Uncertainty Management (AUM) Perspective," in *Intercultural Communication Competence*, R. L. Wiseman and J. Koester (eds.), Sage, Newbury Park, CA, 1993, pp. 33–71.

Empirical support: William B. Gudykunst and Tsukasa Nishida, "Anxiety, Uncertainty, and Perceived Effectiveness of Communication Across Relationships and Cultures," *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, Vol. 25, 2001, pp. 55–71.

Gudykunst's parallel theory of intercultural adjustment: William B. Gudykunst, "An Anxiety/Uncertainty Management (AUM) Theory of Strangers' Intercultural Adjustment," in *Theorizing About Intercultural Communication*, William B. Gudykunst (ed.), Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA, 2005, pp. 419–457.

Overview of intercultural theories: William B. Gudykunst, "Intercultural Communication Theories," in *Handbook of International and Intercultural Communication*, William B. Gudykunst and Bella Mody (eds.), Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA, 2002, pp. 207–224.

Interpersonal vs. intergroup relations: William B. Gudykunst and Robin Shapiro, "Communication in Everyday Interpersonal and Intergroup Encounters," *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, Vol. 20, 1996, pp. 19–45.

Mindfulness: Ellen J. Langer, *The Power of Mindful Learning*, Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA, 1997.

Practical application of theory: William B. Gudykunst, *Bridging Differences: Effective Intergroup Communication*, 4th ed., Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA, 2003.

Critique: Stella Ting-Toomey, "Culture and Interpersonal Relationship Development: Some Conceptual Issues," in *Communication Yearbook 15*, James A. Anderson (ed.), Sage, Newbury Park, CA, 1989, pp. 371–382.